INTRODUCTION SPECULATION IS GENERALLY DEFINED as a process for transferring price risks.
Given this admittedly vague definition, there is considerable disagreement about the conditions which allow a speculative market to arise. The Working theory (see (Hirshleifer [15, 17] , Feiger [7] ) makes differences in beliefs the key to speculative behavior: in particular the degree of traders' risk aversion affects only the size of their gamble. Associated with this theory and (as we shall see below) potentially at the root of its internal inconsistency is the idea that better informed traders are able to make money on the average. On the other hand, the Keynes-Hicks theory of speculation emphasizes not differences in beliefs, but differences in willingness to take risk or in initial positions as the foundation of a speculative market. The social function of speculation is thus to shift price risks from more to less risk averse traders or from traders with riskier positions to those with less risky positions. In other words, speculation in the Keynes-Hicks tradition is a substitute for insurance markets.
In markets with sequential trading (e.g., a stock market), the prospect of capital gains introduces a new motive for speculation: Harrison and Kreps [14] , following Kaldor and Keynes, say that "investors exhibit speculative behavior if the right to resell [an] asset makes them willing to pay more for it than they would pay if obliged to hold it forever."
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of speculative behavior when traders have rational expectations. The general idea is fairly simple: unless traders have different priors about the value of a given asset or are able to use the corresponding market for insurance purposes, this market does not give rise to gains from trade. Thus speculation relies on inconsistent plans and is ruled out by rational expectations.
We start by recalling Kreps' [17] result on the impossibility of pure speculation in the static model (see Milgrom-Stokey [20] for an alternative approach). This theorem provides insight on the rest of the paper, and moreover has important consequences for the theory of speculation. In particular, it definitely contradicts the Working theory for markets with traders having the same prior (but differential private information) and deriving information from the price. Indeed one might ask what is needed in order to observe speculative behavior. In Section 3, we state the four conditions giving rise to static speculation.
The main contribution of this paper lies in the integration of the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) concept into a model of dynamic speculation. We distinguish between myopic and fully dynamic concepts of rational expectations. We first characterize myopic REE and demonstrate the martingale properties of "price bubbles." We then argue that the refined concept of fully dynamic REE is more reasonable if one assumes rationality of the traders. We conclude by proving that in a fully dynamic REE, price bubbles do not exist.
Before turning to a formal treatment of static (Section 3) and dynamic (Section 4) speculation, we give an informal analysis of the ideas and results of the paper (Section 2).
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND SPECULATION
The idea behind a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is that each trader is able to make inferences from the market price about the profitability of his trade. Traders know the statistical relationship between the market price and the realized value of their trade (the "forecast function") and use the information conveyed by the price as well as their private information to choose their demands.
In Section 3 we consider the consequences of rational expectations for static speculation. We observe that, contrary to the Working-Hirshleifer-Feiger view, rational and risk averse traders never trade solely on the basis of differences in information. Risk neutral traders may trade, but do not expect any gain from their trade. Consider a purely speculative market (i.e., a market where the aggregate monetary gain is zero and insurance plays no role). Assume that it is common knowledge that traders are risk averse, rational, have the same prior and that the market clears. Then it is also common knowledge that a trader's expected monetary gain given his information must be positive in order for him to be willing to trade. The market clearing condition then requires that no trader expect a monetary gain from his trade. This process can be illustrated by the following elementary example: At the beginning of a seminar the speaker states a proposition. Suppose that the validity of the proposition is in question, and that each member of the audience but the speaker either has no information about its validity or else has some counter-example in mind (which is correct with certainty or with a high probability). In the first case, the member will not be willing to bet with the speaker, who, after all, having worked on the topic before the seminar, is endowed with superior information. In the second case, he will be willing to bet that the proposition is incorrect. The speaker can therefore deduce that only members of the audience having a counter-example in mind will be willing to bet with him.2 Consequently, the speaker will not be willing to bet at all.
Section 4 considers a model of a sequential stock market similar to that of Harrison and Kreps [14] in order to focus on the Kaldor-Keynes definition of speculation. To this end we describe a stock market as a sequence of rational expectations equilibria. The dividends of a given firm (do d1, . . .., d, . . . ) are assumed to follow an exogenously given stochastic process. Each trader, who is assumed to be risk neutral, will have in each period some information (signal) about the process. This information differs among traders. It is often assumed that in markets with homogeneous information traders base their behavior on the comparison between the current price and (the probability distribution of) next period's price; the corresponding REE for a stock market with heterogeneous information will be named "myopic REE." We show that, for any given period, even if short sales are prohibited, a trader will not expect a gain from his trade, regardless of what information he may possess (of course, the price expectation is taken relative to the trader's own information and the information he can infer from the market). This does not mean that the price of the stock has to be equal to any market fundamental (i.e., the expected present discounted value of dividends). The right to resell the asset in general makes traders willing to pay more for it than they would pay if obliged to hold it forever, i.e., more than their market fundamental. Indeed, in an equilibrium of a stock market with an infinite horizon, the market fundamentals of different traders are not generally equal. Each active trader's price bubble is defined to be the difference between the market price and his market fundamental. Price bubbles are shown to follow discounted martingales. This differs from a finite-horizon stock market, in which the price is equal to the market fundamental of any active trader (of any trader, if short sales are allowed).
One may nevertheless dislike the concept of myopic REE, especially in an economy with a finite number of traders. Indeed, a sequence of myopic REE does not necessarily lead to a well defined (i.e., converging) expected gain function for each trader. In Section 4a, we exhibit an elementary example of myopic REE where any optimal strategy (i.e., maximizing a trader's expected payoff over the whole time horizon) requires the trader to realize his profits in finite time (i.e., quit the market). This is inconsistent, as the set of traders is finite. We are thus led to define a fully dynamic REE as a sequence of self-fulfilling forecast functions such that there exists for each agent a sequence of (information contingent) stock holdings, called a "strategy", satisfying the following properties: (i) in each period t, and for any information a trader i may have at 2This point may remind the readers familiar with the literature on auctions of the winner's curse. time t, the corresponding strategy maximizes i's expected present discounted gain from t on (i's posterior being computed from the common prior, and i's information, whether acquired individually or inferred from the market price); (ii) the market clears in each period and for any information traders have in this period.
As one might expect, the definition of a fully dynamic REE puts very strong restrictions on the type of price and expectation functions that can arise in equilibrium. In fact, Section 4b shows that in a fully dynamic REE, price bubbles disappear and every trader's market fundamental equals the price of the stock, regardless of whether short sales are allowed or not. This implies that speculative behavior in the Kaldor-Keynes-Harrison-Kreps sense cannot be observed in a fully dynamic REE. The vector of all signals is: s = (. . . ,si, . . . ) belonging to a set S (contained in X iSi). Then S2 _ E x S is the set of states of nature, and we assume that all the traders have the same prior v on U2. Let T be a set contained in S; we denote by pi(si I T) the marginal probability of signal Si conditional on {s E T}. Vi(si) denotes the prior probability of signal s'. We assume that all signals have a positive probability:
Vi,Vs' E Si: Vi(i) > 0.
It will be clear that the result holds for much more general probability spaces. We already know that the total monetary gain in such a market is zero: G' = 0. We shall say that the market is purely speculative if moreover the participants' initial positions (corresponding to no trade on the market) are uncorrelated with the return on the asset. 4 Since trader i has a concave utility function, has no insurance motive in the market, and has the option not to trade, he must expect a nonnegative gain: In other words, in a REE no trader can expect a gain. We can now state the following proposition:
In a REE of a purely speculative market with risk-averse or risk-neutral traders, risk-averse traders do not trade; risk-neutral traders may trade, but they do not expect any gain from their trade. Proposition 1 shows that one must relax at least one of the previous assumptions if static speculation is to occur: (a) One may introduce risk-loving traders.
4"Uncorrelated" is relative to the information of the trader. This definition is more stringent than the condition that the initial position be uncorrelated with the return of the asset and the signal received by the trader. Kreps [17] observes that the information conveyed by the price may introduce some correlation between the initial position and the return of the asset and thus create an insurance motive for speculation. Hence, we assume that the initial positions of all traders are uncorrelated with the return on the asset and the set of signals.
(b) One may depart from the strict Bayesian assumption that priors are identical for everybody and that differences in beliefs are simply the result of differences in information.
(c) One other way of transforming the market into a "positive-sum game" from the point of view of the set of rational agents is to introduce a non-rational agent. A related method consists in introducing traders whose (possibly stochastic) demand or supply is independent of the market price (see Grossman [11] and Grossman-Stiglitz [13] ), although one must be cautious and give a more complete description of the model before calling these traders irrational. The set of all rational players is then able to take advantage of this type of player, who, roughly speaking, faces an unfair bet. one-period stock market; there is a fixed supply x of the stock. If, following Grossman, one assumes that traders have constant absolute risk aversion utility functions, the demands are independent of wealth and thus one does not have to specify who owns the initial stock in order to compute the equilibrium price. However, the stock market equilibrium may be interpreted in terms of (c) if the holders of the initial stock x sell the whole stock to the set of rational buyers whatever the price or in terms of (d) if the rational traders also own the initial stock and thus try to hedge (or speculate) on the market. 6See, for example, Grossman [ 
DYNAMIC SPECULATION: A MODEL OF A STOCK MARKET WITH HETEROGENEOUS INFORMATION
This section is particularly concerned with the Kaldor-Keynes-HarrisonKreps definition of speculation, according to which investors exhibit speculative behavior if the right to resell an asset makes them willing to pay more for it than they would pay if obliged to hold it forever. To this end, we describe the market for a given stock as a sequence of REE.
The stock may be traded at dates t = 0, 1, 2, ... . The (nonnegative) dividend dt is declared immediately prior to trading at time t, and paid to traders who hold the stock at (t -1). As in Harrison and Kreps [14] , we assume that the sequence of dividends {do, dl, ... , dt,... } is an exogenously given stochastic process (for example driven by the demand in the market of the firm's output, ... ). At time t, the stock is traded at price pt.
There is a finite set of traders i = 1, . . ., I. Trader i is assumed to be risk-neutral and to discount the future with the discount factor y.8 The traders' risk neutrality implies that speculation would not exist if the market were not to reopen after the first period, and thus allow us to focus on the dynamic features of asset markets. His holding of the stock at time t is xt/ and, given an aggregate stock x, the market clearing condition is 2 The interpretation of (2) is that each trader maximizes his expected short-run gain.
We now prove that eveni if short sales are prohibited, the price pt must be equal to the expectation of the sum of the discounted dividend and the discounted next shorthand xJ (s,, pt) for x,(s, S,(p,), Pt) . This is a myopic REE. The first thing to observe is that, if we try to compute the discounted gains of the traders, they do not converge: Thus, it is not possible to define present discounted gains associated with the myopic REE strategies. Nevertheless, we may observe that A (resp. B) can always guarantee himself 2 (resp. 0) by leaving the market just after selling. In fact, if a trader wants to maximize his present discounted gain, he has to "realize his profits" by refusing to repurchase the stock at some date; this strategy can also be viewed as a dominant strategy in that the trader avoids running the risk of getting stuck with a devalued stock if the other trader switches to a "finite time strategy." Thus it would be natural to assume that A's payoff is 2 and B's payoff is 0. But those payoffs are inconsistent since they must add up to the market fundamental which is 1.
To summarize, in a myopic REE, each trader must (i) believe that he will be able to sell the asset, (ii) realize his profits in finite time. These two conditions are inconsistent with the assumption that the number of traders is finite. Note that the kind of price bubble arising in the previous example can not be observed in a myopic REE (and of course not in a fully dynamic REE, where no price bubble exists). Proposition 4 tells us that in a myopic REE prices have to grow "on average" at the rate (1/ y). On the contrary the price function of the previous example is constant over time, as are the price bubbles."5
4c. Discussion
This section has been concerned with the relative evaluation of two assets over time. We have assumed that traders are never constrained by wealth in the amount they purchase. One may wonder whether the presence of wealth constraints would not be an alternative reason to rule out price bubbles. Let us first note that wealth constraints can be relaxed by the availability of credit. However we would like to argue that, even if credit schemes are not designed to enable the traders to buy the asset, price bubbles may still exist with an infinite number of traders, e.g., with overlapping generations. We know from growth theory that the economy may grow at a rate equal to or exceeding the rate of interest. Thus it is not clear that exponentially growing price bubbles would in general be ruled out by the presence of wealth constraints. Casual observation suggests that assets such as stamps, coins, paintings, diamonds, some land, etc., are consistently priced above their market fundamental.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Two basic principles underlie the mathematics. First, one should not count on differences in information in order to achieve a speculative gain. This result is best understood by using the familiar common-knowledge interpretation of a REE, and by observing that not everyone can possess "better than average" information. Of course, in a market where some other traders do rely on the belief that they have superior information, it might pay to do so as well. We then (0, 1), {(1, 0) or (1, 1)}. face a recursive problem. The question is: Can rational traders expect in equilibrium a speculative gain based on their allegedly superior information or their information concerning the other traders' behavior? The commonknowledge interpretation of a REE would require the answer to be no.
Second, in a dynamic framework with a finite number of agents, a rational trader will not enter a market where a bubble has already grown, since some traders have already realized their gains and left a negative-sum game to the other traders. Again, if one is able to find a "sucker," it may pay to participate. The point is that in an equilibrium with a finite number of traders, it is not possible for everyone to find a buyer and avoid "getting stuck with a hot potato." This is not to deny the positive relevance of Keynes' "Castles in the Air" theory, which undoubtedly explains a number of speculative phenomena. More research should be devoted to the explanation of actual price bubbles by non-rational behavior"6 as well as to the study of the manipulability and controllability of speculative markets. But Section 4 vindicates the "Firm Foundation" asset pricing theory as a normative concept for the kind of markets we have considered; moreover, the views developed above have some counterparts in the investment literature (see, e.g., Malkiel [19] 16For an example of a behavioral theory of price bubbles, see Levine [18] .
